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Nuclei: Arbitrary Command Execution via DAST Code Signature Bypass
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jul 16, 2026
in
projectdiscovery/nuclei
•
Updated Sep 22, 2026
A vulnerability in Nuclei's DAST template loading path allows unsigned code: protocol templates to execute, bypassing the cryptographic signature requirement that is meant to prevent arbitrary command execution from untrusted templates.
Affected Component
The issue is in the template loader's DAST loading branch. When -dast is enabled and a template contains a fuzzing: block, the loader accepted the template through a code path that omitted the unsigned-code-template signature check present in the normal loading branch.
Description
Nuclei requires code: protocol templates to be cryptographically signed before execution. Unsigned code templates are normally skipped with a warning. However, when a template combined a fuzzing: block (making it DAST-eligible) with an unsigned code: block, enabling -dast routed the template through the DAST loader branch, which did not enforce signature verification.
For multiprotocol templates containing both HTTP and code: blocks, the unsigned code request was included in the execution queue regardless of whether -code was set. This allowed arbitrary shell command execution from an unsigned code: block with only -dast enabled.
Note
Both DAST mode (-dast) and code-protocol templates are disabled by default. Code templates normally require both the -code flag and a valid template signature. This issue bypassed the signature and -code controls only when -dast was explicitly enabled.
Affected Users
CLI users running DAST/fuzzing scans (-dast) with untrusted or attacker-supplied templates that contain both fuzzing: and code: blocks.
SDK users who integrate Nuclei with DAST mode enabled and allow end users to supply custom templates.
Patches
The vulnerability is fixed in Nuclei v3.10.0. Upgrading is strongly recommended.
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
Learn more on MITRE.
A vulnerability in Nuclei's DAST template loading path allows unsigned
code:protocol templates to execute, bypassing the cryptographic signature requirement that is meant to prevent arbitrary command execution from untrusted templates.Affected Component
The issue is in the template loader's DAST loading branch. When
-dastis enabled and a template contains afuzzing:block, the loader accepted the template through a code path that omitted the unsigned-code-template signature check present in the normal loading branch.Description
Nuclei requires
code:protocol templates to be cryptographically signed before execution. Unsigned code templates are normally skipped with a warning. However, when a template combined afuzzing:block (making it DAST-eligible) with an unsignedcode:block, enabling-dastrouted the template through the DAST loader branch, which did not enforce signature verification.For multiprotocol templates containing both HTTP and
code:blocks, the unsigned code request was included in the execution queue regardless of whether-codewas set. This allowed arbitrary shell command execution from an unsignedcode:block with only-dastenabled.Note
Both DAST mode (
-dast) and code-protocol templates are disabled by default. Code templates normally require both the-codeflag and a valid template signature. This issue bypassed the signature and-codecontrols only when-dastwas explicitly enabled.Affected Users
-dast) with untrusted or attacker-supplied templates that contain bothfuzzing:andcode:blocks.Patches
Mitigation
Upgrade to Nuclei v3.10.0, where code template signature verification is enforced before DAST loading.
In the meantime, avoid running DAST scans with untrusted templates.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not an option, do not use
-dastwith templates from unverified sources.Acknowledgments
Thanks to @daffainfo for reporting this issue.
References